People punish defection, not failures to conform to the majority.

Do people punish others for defecting or for failing to conform to the majority? In two experiments, we manipulated whether the participants' partners cooperated or defected in the majority of the trials of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. The effects of this base-rate manipulation on cooperation and punishment were assessed using a multinomial processing tree model. High compared to low cooperation rates of the partners increased participants' cooperation. When participants' cooperation was not enforced through partner punishment, the participants' cooperation was closely aligned to the cooperation rates of the partners. Moral punishment of defection increased when cooperation rates were high compared to when defection rates were high. However, antisocial punishment of cooperation when defection rates were high was much less likely than moral punishment of defection when cooperation rates were high. In addition, antisocial punishment was increased when cooperation rates were high compared to when defection rates were high. The latter two results contradict the assumption that people punish conformity-violating behavior regardless of whether the behavior supports or disrupts cooperation. Punishment is thus sensitive to the rates of cooperation and defection but, overall, the results are inconsistent with the idea that punishment primarily, let alone exclusively, serves to enforce conformity with the majority.

Evidence of a metacognitive illusion in judgments about the effects of music on cognitive performance.

Two experiments serve to examine how people make metacognitive judgments about the effects of task-irrelevant sounds on cognitive performance. According to the direct-access account, people have direct access to the processes causing auditory distraction. According to the processing-fluency account, people rely on the feeling of processing fluency to make heuristic metacognitive judgments about the distracting effects of sounds. To manipulate the processing fluency of simple piano melodies and segments of Mozart's sonata K. 448, the audio files of the music were either left in their original forward direction or reversed. The results favor the processing-fluency account over the direct-access account: Even though, objectively, forward and backward music had the same distracting effect on serial recall, stimulus-specific prospective metacognitive judgments showed that participants incorrectly predicted only backward music but not forward music to be distracting. The difference between forward and backward music was reduced but not eliminated in global retrospective metacognitive judgments that participants provided after having experienced the distracting effect of the music first-hand. The results thus provide evidence of a metacognitive illusion in people's judgments about the effects of music on cognitive performance.

Communicating emotions, but not expressing them privately, reduces moral punishment in a Prisoner's Dilemma game.

The existence of moral punishment, that is, the fact that cooperative people sacrifice resources to punish defecting partners requires an explanation. Potential explanations are that people punish defecting partners to privately express or to communicate their negative emotions in response to the experienced unfairness. If so, then providing participants with alternative ways to privately express or to communicate their emotions should reduce moral punishment. In two experiments, participants interacted with cooperating and defecting partners in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. After each round, participants communicated their emotions to their partners (Experiments 1 and 2) or only expressed them privately (Experiment 2). Each trial concluded with a costly punishment option. Compared to a no-expression control group, moral punishment was reduced when emotions were communicated to the defecting partner but not when emotions were privately expressed. Moral punishment may thus serve to communicate emotions to defecting partners. However, moral punishment was only reduced but far from being eliminated, suggesting that the communication of emotions does not come close to replacing moral punishment. Furthermore, prompting participants to focus on their emotions had undesirable side-effects: Privately expressing emotions diminished cooperation, enhanced hypocritical punishment (i.e., punishment of defecting partners by defecting participants), and induced an unspecific bias to punish the partners irrespective of their actions.

The animacy effect on free recall is equally large in mixed and pure word lists or pairs.

The cognitive mechanisms underlying the animacy effect on free recall have as yet to be identified. According to the attentional-prioritization account, animate words are better recalled because they recruit more attention at encoding than inanimate words. The account implies that the animacy effect should be larger when animate words are presented together with inanimate words in mixed lists or pairs than when animate and inanimate words are presented separately in pure lists or pairs. The present series of experiments served to systematically test whether list composition or pair composition modulate the animacy effect. In Experiment 1, the animacy effect was compared between mixed and pure lists. In Experiments 2 and 3, the words were presented in mixed or pure pairs to manipulate the direct competition for attention between animate and inanimate words at encoding. While encoding was intentional in Experiments 1 and 2, it was incidental in Experiment 3. In each experiment, a significant animacy effect was obtained, but the effect was equally large in mixed and pure lists or pairs of animate and inanimate words despite considerable sensitivity of the statistical test of the critical interaction. These findings provide evidence against the attentional-prioritization account of the animacy effect.

Manipulations of richness of encoding do not modulate the animacy effect on memory.

The animacy effect refers to the memory advantage of words denoting animate beings over words denoting inanimate objects. Remembering animate beings may serve important evolutionary functions, but the cognitive mechanism underlying the animacy effect has remained elusive. According to the richness-of-encoding account, animate words stimulate participants to generate more ideas than inanimate words at encoding. These ideas may later serve as retrieval cues and thus enhance recall. There is as yet only correlational evidence associating rich encoding and the animacy advantage in memory. To experimentally test the assumption that richness of encoding plays a causal role, we examined whether the animacy effect can be modulated by facilitating or suppressing rich encoding. In Experiment 1, richness of encoding was manipulated by requiring participants to write down four ideas or one idea in response to animate and inanimate words. In Experiment 2, the one-idea-generation condition was compared to an unrestricted-idea-generation condition. In Experiment 3, the unrestricted-idea-generation condition was compared to a distractor-task condition in which the idea-generation process was suppressed. In Experiment 4, richness of encoding was manipulated by asking participants to rate the relevance of the words for achieving three survival-related goals or one survival-related goal. Animate words were better remembered than inanimate words. In three of the four experiments, rich encoding led to improved recall. However, none of the manipulations of richness of encoding affected the animacy effect on memory, demonstrating its robustness irrespective of the encoding conditions. These results weaken the richness-of-encoding account of the animacy effect on memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Animacy enhances recollection but not familiarity: Convergent evidence from the remember-know-guess paradigm and the process-dissociation procedure.

Words representing living beings are better remembered than words representing nonliving objects, a robust finding called the animacy effect. Considering the postulated evolutionary-adaptive significance of this effect, the animate words' memory advantage should not only affect the quantity but also the quality of remembering. To test this assumption, we compared the quality of recognition memory between animate and inanimate words. The remember-know-guess paradigm (Experiment 1) and the process-dissociation procedure (Experiment 2) were used to assess both subjective and objective aspects of remembering. Based on proximate accounts of the animacy effect that focus on elaborative encoding and attention, animacy is expected to selectively enhance detailed recollection but not the acontextual feeling of familiarity. Multinomial processing-tree models were applied to disentangle recollection, familiarity, and different types of guessing processes. Results obtained from the remember-know-guess paradigm and the process-dissociation procedure convergently show that animacy selectively enhances recollection but does not affect familiarity. In both experiments, guessing processes were unaffected by the words' animacy status. Animacy thus not only enhances the quantity but also affects the quality of remembering: The effect is primarily driven by recollection. The results support the richness-of-encoding account and the attentional account of the animacy effect on memory.

Negative target stimuli do not influence cross-modal auditory distraction.

The present study served to test whether emotion modulates auditory distraction in a serial-order reconstruction task. If auditory distraction results from an attentional trade-off between the targets and distractors, auditory distraction should decrease when attention is focused on targets with high negative arousal. Two experiments (with a total N of 284 participants) were conducted to test whether auditory distraction is influenced by target emotion. In Experiment 1 it was examined whether two benchmark effects of auditory distraction-the auditory-deviant effect and the changing-state effect-differ as a function of whether negative high-arousal targets or neutral low-arousal targets are used. Experiment 2 complements Experiment 1 by testing whether target emotion modulates the disruptive effects of reversed sentential speech and steady-state distractor sequences relative to a quiet control condition. Even though the serial order of negative high-arousal targets was better remembered than that of neutral low-arousal targets, demonstrating an emotional facilitation effect on serial-order reconstruction, auditory distraction was not modulated by target emotion. The results provide support of the automatic-capture account according to which auditory distraction, regardless of the specific type of auditory distractor sequence that has to be ignored, is a fundamentally stimulus-driven effect that is rooted in the automatic processing of the to-be-ignored auditory stream and remains unaffected by emotional-motivational factors.

Coping with high advertising exposure: a source-monitoring perspective.

Consumers are exposed to large amounts of advertising every day. One way to avoid being manipulated is to monitor the sources of persuasive messages. In the present study it was tested whether high exposure to advertising affects the memory and guessing processes underlying source attributions. Participants were exposed to high or low proportions of advertising messages that were intermixed with product statements from a trustworthy source. In a subsequent memory test, participants had to remember the sources of these statements. In Experiments 1 and 2, high advertising exposure led to increased source memory and decreased recognition of the statements in comparison to low advertising exposure. High advertising exposure also induced an increased tendency toward guessing that statements whose sources were not remembered came from advertising. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that the presence of advertising, relative to its absence, leads to a skeptical guessing bias. Being exposed to advertising thus has pronounced effects on the memory and guessing processes underlying source attributions. These changes in source monitoring can be interpreted as coping mechanisms that serve to protect against the persuasive influence of advertising messages.

The metacognition of auditory distraction: Judgments about the effects of deviating and changing auditory distractors on cognitive performance.

The duplex-mechanism account of auditory distraction has been extended to predict that people should have metacognitive awareness of the disruptive effect of auditory deviants on cognitive performance but little to no such awareness of the disruptive effect of changing-state relative to steady-state auditory distractors. To test this prediction, we assessed different types of metacognitive judgments about the disruptive effects of auditory-deviant, changing-state, and steady-state distractor sequences on serial recall. In a questionnaire, participants read about an irrelevant-speech experiment and were asked to provide metacognitive beliefs about how serial-recall performance would be affected by the different types of distractors. Another sample of participants heard the auditory distractors before predicting how their own serial-recall performance would suffer or benefit from the distractors. After participants had experienced the disruptive effects of the distractor sequences first hand, they were asked to make episodic retrospective judgments about how they thought the distractor sequences had affected their performance. The results consistently show that people are, on average, well aware of the greater disruptive effect of deviant and changing-state relative to steady-state distractors. Irrespective of condition, prospective and retrospective judgments of distraction were poor predictors of the individual susceptibility to distraction. These findings suggest that phenomena of auditory distraction cannot be categorized in two separate classes based on metacognitive awareness.

Cognitive load decreases cooperation and moral punishment in a Prisoner's Dilemma game with punishment option.

The present study serves to test whether cooperation and moral punishment are affected by cognitive load. Dual-process theories postulate that moral behavior is intuitive which leads to the prediction that cooperation and moral punishment should remain unaffected or may even increase when cognitive load is induced by a secondary task. However, it has also been proposed that cognitive control and deliberation are necessary to choose an economically costly but morally justified option. A third perspective implies that the effects of cognitive load may depend on the specific processes involved in social dilemmas. In the present study, participants played a simultaneous Prisoner's Dilemma game with a punishment option. First, both players decided to cooperate or defect. Then they had the opportunity to punish the partners. In the cognitive-load group, cognitive load was induced by a continuous tone classification task while the no-load group had no distractor task. Under cognitive load, cooperation and moral punishment decreased in comparison to the no-load condition. By contrast, hypocritical and antisocial punishment were not influenced by the dual-task manipulation. Increased cognitive load was associated with a bias to punish the partners irrespective of the outcome of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, suggesting that punishment was applied less purposefully in the cognitive-load condition. The present findings are thus in line with the idea that the availability of cognitive resources does not always have a suppressive effect on moral behaviors, but can have facilitating effects on cooperation and moral punishment.

Moral labels increase cooperation and costly punishment in a Prisoner's Dilemma game with punishment option.

To determine the role of moral norms in cooperation and punishment, we examined the effects of a moral-framing manipulation in a Prisoner's Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. In each round of the game, participants decided whether to cooperate or to defect. The Prisoner's Dilemma game was identical for all participants with the exception that the behavioral options were paired with moral labels ("I cooperate" and "I cheat") in the moral-framing condition and with neutral labels ("A" and "B") in the neutral-framing condition. After each round of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, participants had the opportunity to invest some of their money to punish their partners. In two experiments, moral framing increased moral and hypocritical punishment: participants were more likely to punish partners for defection when moral labels were used than when neutral labels were used. When the participants' cooperation was enforced by their partners' moral punishment, moral framing did not only increase moral and hypocritical punishment but also cooperation. The results suggest that moral framing activates a cooperative norm that specifically increases moral and hypocritical punishment. Furthermore, the experience of moral punishment by the partners may increase the importance of social norms for cooperation, which may explain why moral framing effects on cooperation were found only when participants were subject to moral punishment.

Guess what? Different source-guessing strategies for old versus new information.

The probability-matching account states that learned specific episodic contingencies of item types and source dominate over general schematic expectations in source guessing. However, recent evidence from Bell et al. [(2020). Source attributions for detected new items: Persistent evidence for schematic guessing. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 73(9), 1407-1422] suggest that this only applies to source guessing for information that is recognised as belonging to a previously encoded episode. When information was detected as being new, participants persisted in applying schematic knowledge about the sources' profession. This dissociation in source guessing for detected-old and detected-new information may have been fostered by the specific source-monitoring paradigm by Bell et al. (2020) in which sources were a group of individuals in a certain profession rather than fixed persons from that profession for whom episodic contingencies are more likely to persist also for new information. The aim of the present study was to test whether source guessing for detected-old versus detected-new information also dissociates in a more typical source-monitoring task, the doctor-lawyer paradigm, in which one individual doctor and one lawyer present profession-related information. Despite this change in paradigm, source guessing was based on the item-source contingency only for detected-old information, whereas schematic knowledge persisted for detected-new information. The present study thus adds evidence for persistent schema-based source guessing for new information.

Do they really wash their hands? Prevalence estimates for personal hygiene behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic based on indirect questions.

BACKGROUND: During the COVID-19 pandemic, billions of people have to change their behaviours to slow down the spreading of the virus. Protective measures include self-isolation, social (physical) distancing and compliance with personal hygiene rules, particularly regular and thorough hand washing. Prevalence estimates for the compliance with the COVID-19 measures are often based on direct self-reports. However, during a health crisis there is strong public pressure to comply with health and safety regulations so that people's responding in direct self-reports may be seriously compromised by social desirability. METHODS: In an online survey, an indirect questioning technique was used to test whether the prevalence of hygiene practices may be lower than in conventional surveys when confidentiality of responding is guaranteed. The Extended Crosswise Model is an indirect questioning technique that guarantees the confidentiality of responding. To the degree that direct self-reports are biased by social desirability, prevalence estimates of hygiene practices such as thorough hand washing based on the Extended Crosswise Model should be lower than those based on direct self-reports. RESULTS: We analysed data of 1434 participants. In the direct questioning group 94.5% of the participants claimed to practice proper hand hygiene; in the indirect questioning group a significantly lower estimate of only 78.1% was observed. CONCLUSIONS: These results indicate that estimates of the degree of commitment to measures designed to counter the spread of the disease may be significantly inflated by social desirability in direct self-reports. Indirect questioning techniques with higher levels of confidentiality seem helpful in obtaining more realistic estimates of the degree to which people follow the recommended personal hygiene measures. More realistic estimates of compliance can help to inform and to adjust public information campaigns on COVID-19 hygiene recommendations.

Monetary incentives have only limited effects on auditory distraction: evidence for the automaticity of cross-modal attention capture.

The duplex-mechanism account of auditory distraction postulates that two distinct forms of auditory distraction can be distinguished by whether or not they can be cognitively controlled. While the interference-by-process component of auditory distraction is postulated to be automatic and independent of cognitive control, the stimulus-aspecific attention capture by auditory deviants and the stimulus-specific attentional diversion by auditorily presented distractor sentences should be suppressed by increased task engagement. Here we test whether incentive-induced changes in task engagement affect the disruption of serial recall by auditory deviants (Experiment 1) and distractor sentences (Experiment 2). Monetary incentives substantially affected recall performance in both experiments. However, the incentive-induced changes in task engagement had only limited effects on auditory distraction. In Experiment 2, increased task engagement was associated with a small decrease of distraction relative to a quiet condition, but strong effects of auditory distraction on performance persisted in conditions of high task engagement in both experiments. Most importantly, and in contrast to the predictions of the duplex-mechanism account, the effects of stimulus-aspecific attention capture (Experiment 1) and stimulus-specific attentional diversion (Experiment 2) remained unaffected by incentive-induced changes in task engagement. These findings are consistent with an automatic-capture account according to which only the processes responsible for the deliberate memorization of the target items are dependent on controlled mental effort while the attention capture by auditory deviants and the attentional diversion by distractor speech are largely automatic.

Memory and metamemory for social interactions: Evidence for a metamemory expectancy illusion.

People do not always have accurate metacognitive awareness of the conditions that lead to good source memory. In Experiment 1, participants studied words referring to bathroom and kitchen items that were either paired with an expected or unexpected room as the source. Participants provided judgments of item and source learning after each item-source pair. In line with previous studies, participants incorrectly predicted their memory to be better for expected than for unexpected sources. Here, we show that this metamemory expectancy illusion generalizes to socially relevant stimuli. In Experiment 2, participants played a prisoner's dilemma game with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners who either cooperated or cheated. After each round of the game, participants provided metamemory judgments about how well they were going to remember the partner's face and behavior. On average, participants predicted their source memory to be better for behaviors that were expected based on the facial appearances of the partners. This stands in contrast to the established finding that veridical source memory is better for unexpected than expected information. Asking participants to provide metamemory judgments at encoding selectively enhanced source memory for the expected information. These results are consistent with how schematic expectations affect source memory and metamemory for nonsocial information, suggesting that both are governed by general rather than by domain-specific principles. Differences between experiments may be linked to the fact that people may have special beliefs about memory for social stimuli, such as the belief that cheaters are particularly memorable (Experiment 3).

Source memory for advertisements: The role of advertising message credibility.

Advertising is seen as an untrustworthy source because of the perceived self-interest of the advertisers in presenting product information in a biased or misleading way. Regulations require advertising messages in print and online media to be labeled as advertisements to allow recipients to take source information into account when judging the credibility of the messages. To date, little is known about how these source tags are remembered. Research within the source-monitoring framework suggests that source attributions are not only based on veridical source memory but are often reconstructed through schematic guessing. In two experiments, we examined how the credibility of advertising messages affects these source attribution processes. The source of the messages affected judgments of credibility at the time of encoding, but the source tags were forgotten after a short period of time. Retrospective source attributions in the absence of memory for the source tags were strongly influenced by the a priori credibility of the messages: Statements with a low a priori credibility were more likely to be (mis)attributed to advertising than statements with high a priori credibility. These findings suggest that the mere labeling of untrustworthy sources is of limited use because source information is quickly forgotten and memory-based source attributions are strongly biased by schematic influences.

Source attributions for detected new items: Persistent evidence for schematic guessing.

Performance in source-monitoring tests is not only determined by source memory but also by source guessing. Source guessing is not random as it is informed by two distinct mechanisms. (1) People may show a schema-based guessing bias and rely on cross-situationally stable world knowledge. (2) They may apply probability matching and rely on the specific item-source contingency experienced at encoding. According to probability matching theory, source guessing is based on probability matching when a specific contingency representation is available. This conclusion is derived from a source-monitoring paradigm in which no source judgements for detected new items are required. Here, we extend this paradigm to examine source guessing not only for detected old items but also for detected new items. The results suggest that participants take the old-new recognition status of the items into account when making source attributions. Probability matching is used only for detected old items: Source guessing sensitively reflects the item-source contingency for these items. For detected new items, participants resort to schema-based guessing. Using schema-based guessing rather than probability matching when judging detected new items may have the advantage that a newly acquired contingency representation that may only be locally valid is not generalised too readily at the expense of a schematic expectation that reflects a larger and more comprehensive learning history.

The "Mnemonic Time-Travel Effect".

This registered report aims at replicating the so-called "mnemonic time-travel" effect. Aksentijevic, Brandt, Tsakanikos, and Thorpe (2019) reported that memory was improved when their participants experienced backward motion before a memory test in comparison to when they experienced forward motion or no motion. This finding was interpreted as suggesting that backward motion brought individuals back to the moment of encoding. In the original study, the mnemonic time-travel effect was robustly found with various types of backward motion (real, simulated, and imagined). Such a spectacular finding calls for a preregistered replication. To determine the robustness of the effect, we performed a close replication of Experiment 4 of Aksentijevic et al. in which the mnemonic time-travel effect was most pronounced. Despite sufficient statistical power to detect an even considerably smaller effect than the one reported by Aksentijevic et al., we found no significant differences among the different motion conditions. The present results thus disconfirm the idea that experiencing backward motion improves memory which suggests that the empirical robustness of the mnemonic time travel effect should be further scrutinized before any conclusions about mnemonic space and time can be drawn.

Effects of Auditory Distraction on Face Memory.

Effects of auditory distraction by task-irrelevant background speech on the immediate serial recall of verbal material are well established. Less is known about the influence of background speech on memory for visual configural information. A recent study demonstrated that face learning is disrupted by joyful music relative to soothing violin music and quiet. This pattern is parallel to findings in the serial-recall paradigm showing that auditory distraction is primarily caused by auditory changes. Here we connect these two streams of research by testing whether face learning is impaired by irrelevant speech. Participants learned faces either in quiet or while ignoring auditory changing-state sequences (sentential speech) or steady-state sequences (word repetitions). Face recognition was impaired by irrelevant speech relative to quiet. Furthermore, changing-state speech disrupted performance more than steady-state speech. The results were replicated in a second study using reversed speech, suggesting that the disruptive potential of the background speech does not depend on its semantic content. These findings thus demonstrate robust effects of auditory distraction on face learning. Theoretical explanations and applied implications are discussed.

Adaptive memory: enhanced source memory for animate entities.

The animacy effect refers to enhanced memory for animate over inanimate items. In two studies, we examined whether this memory advantage generalises to source memory. A multinomial processing tree model was used to disentangle item recognition, source memory, and guessing processes. In Study 1, animate and inanimate words were presented at different spatial locations on the screen. Animacy was associated with enhanced source memory for the spatial locations of the items. In Study 2, pseudowords were associated with animate and inanimate properties. Replicating previous results, the pseudowords were better remembered when they were associated with animate properties than when they were associated with inanimate properties. What is more, participants had enhanced source memory for the association between the pseudowords and the animate properties. The results strengthen the idea that animate items are associated with richer mnemonic representations than inanimate items.